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SECURITIES REGULATIONS:
WHEN IS A CLUB MEMBERSHIP A SECURITY?
by Donald J. Regan*
I. INTRODUCTION
The application of securities regulation laws to the development of
private and semi-private recreational clubs organized for profit is an
area of growing concern. Securities laws are applicable to the creation
or development of a statutory "security." Once a security is present,
questions concerning the need for or exemption from federal registration
or state qualification arise. Therefore, in the first instance, the defini-
tional question must be addressed. Related problems, such as potential
civil liability arising from the presence of a "security,"' although impor-
tant, are beyond the scope of this article. Moreover, even though the
subject embraces federal law ahd federal regulatory authorities, 2 this
discussion will be limited to pure intrastate offerings" with sufficient
planning and control of resales to fit within the intrastate "safe har-
bor" exemption.' Finally, non-profit social clubs and non-profit organi-
zations attached to a residential subdivision which operate solely for the
benefit of members or residents do not pose the same problems as clubs
organized for profit and, thus, are excluded from this discussion.
* B.A., 1956 (University of California at Los Angeles); J.D., 1961 (University of
California at Los Angeles).
1. Not only have the fraud provisions of the securities laws expanded the common law
concepts of fraud and deceit, see In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 910 (1961),
but also SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976), has been held to create a new
private cause of action when the fraud involves a "security." See Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
2. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has issued "no action" letters
regarding club developments. See, e.g., St. Johns Realty Co. (available May 17, 1976);
Beau Monde Cheque Club (available May 10, 1976); Bronze Tree Club (available March
1, 1976). For further discussion of the Bronze Tree Club matter, see note 41 infra and
accompanying text.
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c (11) (1970). The intrastate offering exemption excepts from
the requirement of registration for issuance of securities
[any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident
within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a person
resident and doing business within or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing
business within, such State or Territory.
Id.
4. The "safe harbor" exemption refers to the objective criteria by which a company
can be certain it comes within the intrastate exemption from registration of securities.
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Recreational clubs organized for profit enable large scale participa-
tion in sports and recreational activities with a minimum of inconven-
ience.' Facilities typically consist of structures, playing courts, equip-
ment, amenities and furnishings built around a recreational theme.
Normally, these clubs offer memberships to the public. The problem
arises when one considers whether this offering of memberships to the
public unwittingly creates a securities question. It is possible that the
interest offered may be more than was advertised; it may be a security
via the "investment contract" route as that term is used in section 2(1)
of the Securities Act of 19336 and section 25019 of the California
Corporate Securities Law.7
II. TuE NATuRE OF A CLUB MEMBERSMIP
Interests in clubs are often loosely referred to as "memberships."
Although this term does have a common usage definition, there is no
current statutory definition. Thus, neither the words "member" nor
"membership" have any independent legal significance outside those
imposed by a specific organization.
Although from a securities standpoint no one knows what the term
See SEC Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 240.7 (1976). These criteria are set out in text
accompanying notes 45-51 infra.
Restriction of the scope of this article to intrastate offerings will preclude considera-
tion of clubs in border communities which generally have interstate participation in
membership. See, e.g., Riverview Racquet Club, Inc., 1975-76 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. 80,276 (July 3, 1975), which involved a development in Moore-
head, Minnesota, and Fargo, North Dakota, two cities on either side of the Red River
which together form a single community.
5. The recent boom in recreational club development has been spurred, in part, by the
growing interest in racquetball. Racquetball as a sport is perhaps thirty years old. Its
recent growth as a major leisure-time activity, however, has been spectacular. In 1969,
the First International Racquetball Tournament was held in St. Louis, Missouri. In 1973,
a professional racquetball tour was established. In 1974, the sport counted two million
active participants, and estimates are that that number has at least doubled. See S.
KEELEY, THE COMPLETE BoOK OF RACQUETBALL (1976).
6. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970). A security is defined as
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certifi-
cate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust cer-
tificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional un-
divided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest
or instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Id.
7. CAL. CoRnP. CODE ANN. § 25019 (West Supp. 1976). The definition contained in
this section is patterned after the federal definition in 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
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"membership" means, clubs and recreational facilities have traditionally
issued memberships. California has gone so far as to define the term
security to include, inter alia, "membership in an incorporated or unin-
corporated association ..... I The lack of an express legal definition
of the word "membership" has led the California Commissioner of
Corporations to attempt to clarify the term within the context of the
definitional statute as follows:
The term "membership" as used in § 25109 refers to memberships,
such as those issued by nonprofit organizations, which confer a pro-
prietary right on the holder. A proprietary right may be defined as a
right to the ownership of the assets or earnings of an organization or
the right to control of such organization. A right to control is normally
evidenced by voting rights, whether conferred by the charter documents
or under the provisions of the Corporations Code ... .9
Frequently, the term is misused in connection with clubs.10 Often,
the interest sold by club developers is a license to use real property,
rather than a membership. A license is defined as a
personal, revocable, and unassignable permission or authority to do
one or more acts on the land of another without possessing any interest
therein.'1
Despite the common definition of a license as revocable and non-
8. CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 25019 (West Supp. 1976).
9. Cal. Dept. of Corps., Release No. 15-c (revised), Series C (Oct. 7, 1970).
10. The Commissioner commented upon this misuse:
A membership sold by a profit-making organization which is a license to use the
facilities constitutes a security if the proceeds from the sale of such membership
are used to provide facilities necessary to the full utilization of the membership,
that is, where the purchaser provides the risk capital for the enterprise, such as
for the construction of a golf course and related facilities.
Not every right, privilege, benefit or license sold by a profit-making organization
and which is labeled a "membership" is a membership within the meaning of Sec-
tion 25019. A membership which confers upon the holder nothing more than the
right to enjoy the facilities which are provided, such as key club privileges, the
use of a swimming pool, or the use of golf facilities, is not a membership within
the meaning of Section 25019 and, in the absence of the "risk" element, is not
a security. If the sale of a right to use facilities includes a right to a return of
monies paid or a right to share in the income or profits, it constitutes the sale
of a security, in the nature of an evidence of indebtedness or of an investment
contract.
Id.
11. Eastman v. Piper, 68 Cal. App. 554, 560, 229 P. 1002, 1004 (1924). See 3 H.
MILLER & M. STARR, Cu1RENT LAw oF CALioaRN REAL ESTATE § 705 (1971).
A license is distinguished from a lease in that it confers a personal privilege to use
another's land. The privilege may be given orally and may be revoked at the licensor's
pleasure. Shaw v. Caldwell, 16 Cal. App. 1, 115 P. 941 (1911). A license is
distinguished from an easement in that it is personal, revocable, and unassignable, and
creates no interest in real property, other than the right to do an act on the property
which would otherwise be a trespass. R. PowELL, REAL PIoPrmTY § 429 (1975).
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transferable, cases permit the parties to a license agreement to provide
otherwise. For example, a license may be irrevocable if coupled with
an interest, as when the license is the means by which a licensee
exercises rights under a specifically enforceable contract. 12 Similarly, a
license can be made transferable by agreement of the parties.' 3
Since a license can be created by contract, appropriate safeguards
could be built into a club contract. Thus, a license agreement which
provides assurance that the licensee will not be required to pay unless
and until the promised facilities are open may be the crux of the
regulation of club development. However, if the interest being offered
is in fact a "membership," questions of application of federal and state
securities law will arise.
III. FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW
Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines a security to
include, among other things, an "investment contract."' 4 After an early
narrow and literal application,15 this elastic phrase lay dormant for
many years and only recently has it been the spillway for a flood of
litigation seeking to expand the definition of a security.' 6 A principal
reason for the litigation is that several federal remedies are open to
12. See Bomberger v. McKelney, 35 Cal. 2d 607, 220 P.2d 729 (1950):
A mere license to enter or use premises may be revoked at any time by the licensor.
Various factors, however, may render a license irrevocable, and it is generally
recognized that a license coupled with an interest is not revocable but continues
to exist for the period contemplated by the license.
Id. at 618, 220 P.2d at 736 (citations omitted).
13. See Herman v. Rohan, 37 Cal. App. 678, 174 P. 349 (1918):
[I]t may be said that even considering the matter a personal privilege or license,
there is nothing whatever in the law to prevent the defendants from making an
agreement, if they saw fit, to the effect that this personal privilege might be as-
signed. The property was theirs; they were letting whatever privilege Herman had
and whatever rights he possessed in the stall to him; and they could legally...
agree that he might sell those rights ....
Id. at 681, 174 P. 350.
14. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970), is set
out at note 6 supra.
15. SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1945). The Court in Howey set forth the
following definition of an investment contract:
[A] contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a com-
mon enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter
or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evi-
denced by formal certificates or by nominal interest in the physical assets employed
in the enterprise.
Id. at 298-99. This definition has become commonly known as the "Howey test."
16. See notes 18-28 infra and accompanying text.
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disenchanted buyers or sellers if they can prove that what they bought or
sold 7 was a security.
During the last few years the definition of a security has been con-
stantly expanding to include such items as condominium units,' 8 feedlot
financing arrangements,19 commercial paper,1° commodity contracts,21
real estate lots coupled with land sales contracts, 22 trust deeds, 28 animals
purchased and raised but pooled for sale as a unit,24 whiskey warehouse
receipts, 25 promissory notes,26 interests in pension funds,27 and, most
17. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952).
18. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5347 (Jan. 4, 1973) in which the SEC
states that federal securities laws apply to the offering of condominium units if any one
of the following three factors are present: (1) rental pool arrangement; (2) sales
program based on appreciation in value rather than use of unit; or (3) buyer required
to hold his unit available for rent for a certain period of time or use a designated real
estate agent. Id.
19. See Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1976).
20. See Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 908 (1973); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1009 (1972). The SEC advocates the narrowest possible definition of the term
"commercial paper," which is exempted from the registration requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933 by 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (3) (1970). See SEC Securities Act
Release No. 33-4412 (Sept. 20, 1961).
21. See Johnson v. Arthur Espy, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). Cf. SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir.
1974); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972).
22. See SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1972).
23. See Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961). See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-
3892 (Jan. 31, 1958).
24. See Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974), where
the court looked at the economic realities of the transaction.
25. See SEC v. Haffenden-Rimar Int'l., Inc., 496 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1974); Glen-
Arden Commodities v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. M.A. Lundy
Associates, 362 F. Supp. 226 (D.R.I. 1973). Looking at economic realities, these courts
were able to conclude that the main reason for the purchase was investment, not
consumption.
26. See Exchange Natl Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
In a hotly contested case, Judge Friendly concluded that even a twelve-month promissory
note was a statutory security and expanded previous definitions by stating "the best
alternative now available may lie in greater recourse to the statutory language." Id. at
1137. The statutory language in this case contained a narrow exemption by excluding
any note with a maturity of less than nine months unless the context of the Act other-
wise requires. Id.
27. See Daniel v. International Bhd of Teamsters, 410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. I11. 1976),
appeal docketed, No. 76-1855 (7th Cir., April 29, 1976). In Daniel, the plaintiff had
been a twenty-two year member of Teamsters Local 705. During this time he provided
twenty-two years of nearly uninterrupted employment with covered employers. When he
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pertinent here, situations where the buyer must rely on the seller to
produce promised financial results.
28
The cases cited thus far provide general background, and as commen-
tators have charitably noted, set up a flexible standard for the
definition of a security.29 The nature of the interest received by one
who joins a club is still on the frontier of this area of legal development.
Therefore, it becomes appropriate to analyze the Supreme Court's most
recent and definitive pronouncement in the area.
3 0
In Forman v. Community Services, Inc.,"' the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit found that the right to live in a low-income coopera-
tive apartment in New York was an interest covered by the securities
laws merely because that right was represented by an instrument la-
was involuntarily laid off, the Trustees of the Union Local Pension Fund denied him
benefits. Id. at 543. Daniel apparently tried every legal relief available to him and, as a
last resort, pressed an imaginative attack under the anti-fraud provisions of federal securi-
ties laws. His theory, simply stated, was that his interest in the pension fund constituted
a security. Id. at 550.
The court found that an interest in a pension plan satisfied the much battered, but still
adhered to, Howey test. Id. at 552. See note 15 supra for a statement of the Howey
test. Springing from this treacherous footing, and in an obvious attempt to do justice for
the plaintiff and others similarly situated, the court went on to find that a non-
contributory pension plan involved a "sale." Id. at 553. Section 2(5) of the Securities
Act of 1933 defines a sale to include "every contract of sale or disposition of a security
or interest in a security, for value." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970).
According to the trial court, the SEC's pre-Daniel policy "comports neither to logic
nor economic reality." 410 F. Supp. at 553. Seizing the opportunity, however, the
SEC filed an amicus curiae brief emphasizing that a pension fund is an investment and,
therefore, the securities laws should apply. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Daniel v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, appeal docketed, No. 76-1855 (7th Cir., April 29, 1976).
See [Current Binder] CCH Fed. See. L. Rep. 1 95,846. The United States District Court
for the Central District of California has recently disagreed with Daniel. In Hum v.
Retirement Fund Trust, [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. y 95,855 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 14, 1976), the court held that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. IV, 1974), provides an exclusive remedy for disputes over
trust fund benefits. The issue is of such importance that the ABA Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities, 1933 Act Study Group, has prepared an intensive report on the
policy questions raised by Daniel. See 393 BNA SEc. REG. & L REP. A-4 (March 9,
1977). Whether Daniel will withstand appeal and where it will lead in the search for a
usable definition of a security is unanswered for the immediate future.
28. One example is an equity funding agreement (a life insurance contract coupled
with the purchase of already registered mutual funds), where the combination of
elements produces a package which transcends its component parts. SEC Securities Act
Release No. 33-4491 (May 22, 1962).
29. See, e.g., Fraidin, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation, 30 Bus. LAw.
313 (1975), in which the standards for what is a security are called "quite flexible." Id.
at 326.
30. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), rev'g Forman
v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974).
31. 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'g 366 F. Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd
sub nom. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). See also
Grenader v. Spitz, 537 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1976).
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belled as a share of stock.2 Fortunately, the Supreme Court rejected
this literal approach and held that the label attached to an interest is not
controlling.3 3 The Second Circuit's decision is important, however, in
that it demonstrates that even a sophisticated group of judges will adopt
a strict, literal approach if they feel that the results which will flow from
their decision are socially desirable.
The effect of the Supreme Court decision in Forman was to slow
the advance of the definition of a security on at least two principle
fronts. First, no matter what the interest is called it should not be
held to be a security merely because it is labelled a share of stock.
The Court in Forman indicated that the following features are char-
acteristic of stock that qualifies as a security:
(1) The right to receive dividends contingent upon an apportion-
ment of profits;
(2) Negotiability of the instrument;
(3) Whether or not the instrument can be pledged or hypothecated;
(4) Whether the instrument confers voting rights in proportion to
the number of shares owned; and
(5) Possible appreciation in value."4
Second, the Court stated that there should be no distinction between an
instrument commonly known as a security and an investment contract.
Rather, an investment contract is only one form of a security. The
Court held that, in either case, the basic test for distinguishing a security
transaction from other commercial dealings 5
in shorthand form, embodies the essential attributes that run through
all of the Court's decisions defining a security. The touchstone is the
presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reason-
able expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others. By profits, the Court has meant either
capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initial in-
vestment, ...or a participation in earnings resulting from the use
of investors' funds . . . In such cases the investor is "attracted solely
by the prospects of a return" on his investment. . . . By contrast,
when a purchaser is motivated by a desire to use or consume the item
purchased-"to occupy the land or to develop it themselves," as the
Howey Court put it, . . . -the securities laws do not apply.30
32. 500 F.2d 1246, 1255 (2d Cir. 1974).
33. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), rev'g Forman
v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974).
34. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975).
35. The Court used the Howey test and quoted the language from SEC v. WJ. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1945).
36. 421 U.S. at 852-53 (citations omitted).
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Absent precise judicial definition, the inquiry in the club membership
area, therefore, can appropriately focus on the five criteria set out in
Forman.17 In the development and operation of a non-proprietary
club, no dividends are paid, the license carries no voting rights, it
is not negotiable and it is of no value for use as a pledge (in fact,
properly drawn documents strictly prohibit the pledge or hypothe-
cation of a license). Thus, the only one of the five criteria which real-
istically exists in this situation is the possibility of appreciation in value.
This possiblity of appreciation alone should not turn the club member-
ship into a security. Moreover, since the potential purchaser's main
motivation is a desire to use the facilities, and not to trade in or deal
with his interest, (this cannot be done with a non-proprietary member-
ship), the Forman policy of protecting investors seeking a profit by the
efforts of others does not apply."8
Federal law analysis also requires a brief review of the administrative
position taken by the staff of the SEC. Until recently, when presented
with the question of club memberships as "securities," the staff would
focus only on the transferability of a membership and on the possibility
that it might appreciate in value. As a result of this focus, there was no
assurance that the staff would recommend no action to the SEC if a
particular club offered and sold memberships without registration under
the Securities Act of 1933.39 Thus, no action letters have been issued
only where a club's bylaws prohibit transfer or assignment of member-
ships.40  In March of 1976, the SEC directed its staff not to issue no
action letters involving club interests and to advise that no action letters
issued in the past in this general field do not extend beyond the
particular issues involved and should not be relied upon by any other
person.4
1
37. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
38. See generally United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 856-
57, where the Court noted that potential rental reductions resulting from profits derived
from commercial rentals in the building complex did not attract the "investors" to buy
"stock" in the complex. This did not constitute "an 'expectation of profit' in the sense
found necessary in Howey." Id. at 857 (citations omitted).
39. Dells Camp Denton, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available April 14, 1975);
Stoneridge Golf and Country Club, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 2, 1975)
(after this club changed its organization to make memberships non-transferable, except
at cost, the SEC issued a no-action letter).
40. Riverview Racquet Club, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 4, 1975).
41. Bronze Tree Club, SEC No-Action Letter (available March 1, 1976), where the
Commission supported its refusal to issue a no-action letter with the following reasoning:
Various proposals for the public offering and sale of interests or participations in
resort real estate have been brought to the attention of the Commission. . . .
While no-action letters are limited to the facts presented and do not represent an
interpretation of the law, the Commission is, nevertheless, concerned that inferences
may be drawn from the issuance of no-action letters in this rapidly evolving area.
1977]
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Even if the staff's position that the possibility of appreciation in value
creates a security is accepted, the intrastate exemption from the registra-
tion requirement of the Securities Act of 1933 may be available.42 To
clarify this exemption, the SEC recently adopted Rule 147,3 which is
designed to provide the "safe harbor" criteria by which a company can
be sure that it is entitled to rely on the intrastate exemption. The
company may rely on Rule 147 if all of the following conditions are
satisfied: 4
(1) The issuer must be resident of (doing business, not domi-
ciled) within a single state;
45
(2) The issuer must be doing business within that state. Doing
business means that it receives at least eighty percent of its gross revenue
from within a single state, has at least eighty percent of its assets located
within that state, will use at least eighty percent of its net proceeds from
the offering within that state and, finally, has its principal office located
within such state;4
(3) Each person to whom an interest in the club is offered or sold
must be a resident of the issuer's state of residence;
47
(4) The entire issue must come to rest in the hands of residents of
the issuer's state. "Come to rest" means that no resales may be permit-
ted to non-residents until nine months after the last sale under the
offering;
48
(5) The issuer must take precautions against interstate offers or
sales. Principal among the precautions are that the issuer must place
a legend on the security stating the resale limitations,49 issue a stop
transfer order50 and must receive from each potential participant a
written representation concerning residence.51
Such information could lead to misunderstandings as to the Commission's position
and to contentions in future situations that the Commission had taken a position
which it had not, in fact, taken. Consequently, the Commission has directed its
staff not to issue no-action letters in this area, and to advise that no-action letters
issued in the past in this general field do not extend beyond the particular issue
involved and should not be relied upon by any other person or by the persons re-
ceiving the prior letters for any other offerings.
Id.
42. Most recreational clubs are wholly intrastate developments and can therefore come
within the intrastate offering exemption of 15 U.S.C. § 77c(11) (1970). This statute is
set out at note 3 supra.
43. SEC Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1976).
44. SEC Rule 147, Preliminary Note 3, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1976).
45. SEC Rule 147(c) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c) (1) (1976).
46. SEC Rule 147(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c)(2) (1976).
47. SEC Rule 147(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(d) (1976).
48. SEC Rule 147(e), 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(e) (1976).
49. SEC Rule 147(f)(1)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(f)(1)(i) (1976).
50. SEC Rule 147(f)(1)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 230,147(f)(1)(ii) (1976).
51. SEC Rule 147(f)(1)(iii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(f)(1)(iii) (1976).
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Proper documentation can be designed to satisfy all five of these,
conditions.
In conclusion, the interest evidenced by club membership has not
been held to be a security by any federal court. Nevertheless, the
possibility exists that some federal court might, to remedy an obvious
fraud or injustice, expand the definition to include a club membership.
5 2
Out of an abundance of caution and with a wary eye to the future,
therefore, each intrastate development should be structured to strictly
comply with Rule 147.1' Interstate developments, however, can pro-
ceed only at risk, or, conceding the issue, via registration.
IV. CLIFORNm_ SEcuRITms LAW
The definition of a "security" under California Corporations Code
section 25019" is patterned after section 2(1) of the Securities Act of
1933.15 However, in response to a situation of egregious greed and
unreasonable promotion, the California Supreme Court has expanded
the definition of "security" into new and imaginative territory, not yet
invaded by the federal judiciary.
58
52. See note 27 supra.
53. SEC Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1976).
54. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 25019 (West Supp. 1976) provides:
"Security" means any note; stock; treasury stock; membership in an incorporated
or unincorporated association; bond; debenture; evidence of indebtedness; certificate
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement; collateral trust certifi-
cate; preorganization certificate or subscription; transferable share; investment con-
tract; voting trust certificate; certificate of deposit for a security; certificate of inter-
est or participation in an oil, gas or mining title or lease or in payments out of
production under such a title or lease; any beneficial interest or other security issued
in connection with a funded employees' pension, profit sharing, stock bonus, or
similar benefit plan; or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known
as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or in-
terim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to
or purchase, any of the foregoing. All of, the foregoing are securities whether
or not evidenced by a written document. "Security" does not include: (1) any
beneficial interest in any voluntary inter vivos trust which is not created for the
purpose of carrying on any business or solely for the purpose of voting, or (2) any
beneficial interest in any testamentary trust, or (3) any insurance or endowment
policy or annuity contract under which an insurance company admitted in this state
promises to pay a sum of money (whether or not based upon the investment per-
formance of a segregated fund) either in a lump sum or periodically for life or
some other specified period, or (4) any franchise subject to registration under the
Franchise Investment Law, or exempted from such registration by Section 31100 or
31101 of that law.
Id.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970). See 2 MARsH & VOLK, PAcncn UNNDER THE CAL-
womNA SEcUnrrrns LAWS, app. A-1, 88.3 (1976).
The California Court of Appeal stated that California courts may look to decisions
interpreting the federal definition of a security for aid. Hamilton Jewelers v. Depart-
ment of Corps., 37 Cal. App. 3d 330,-333-n.3, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387, 389 n.3 (1974).
56. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr.
186 (1961). When the Forman district court was urged to adopt the California "risk
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This expansion is most apparent in the case of Silver Hills Country
Club v. Sobieski.Y7 Silver Hills involved promoters who had made a
$400 down payment on the purchase of a ranch. The total cost of the
property was $75,000. These promoters proceeded to sell memberships
and used the membership fees to improve the property, build swimming
pools, and turn the ranch into a country club. By their projections, on
the sale of all memberships, they would have raised enough money to
pay the $75,000.00 purchase price.
The definitional statute in effect at the time of Silver Hills"' was
broader than the present section.5 9 The California Supreme Court
could have based its decision on the statutory language, thereby find-
ing the existence of a security. The court, however, went beyond the
statute and made its decision a matter of policy:
We have here nothing like the ordinary sale of a right to use exist-
ing facilities. Petitioners are soliciting the risk capital with which to
develop a business for profit.60
capital" definition, it rejected this argument with the following language: "mhis would
not seem to be the case for the first federal application of this California state securities
theory." Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1130 (1973), rev'd,
500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. For-
man, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). On appeal, the Supreme Court was also urged to accept
the risk capital theory as part of federal securities law. Without totally rejecting the
theory, the Court looked at it askance and handled the argument in the following
manner:
Respondents urge us to abandon the element of profits in the definition of securi-
ties and to adopt the "risk capital" approach articulated by the California Supreme
Court. . . . Even if we were inclined to adopt such a "risk capital" approach
we would not apply it in the present case. Purchasers of apartments in Co-op
City take no risk in any significant sense.
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 857 n.24 (1975) (citations
omitted).
57. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). For subsequent cases
following the Silver Hills line of reasoning, see Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of
Corps., 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1974); People v. Walberg, 263 Cal.
App. 2d 286, 69 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968).
Silver Hills evoked considerable immediate comment and speculation, see Sobieski,
Securities Regulation in California: Recent Developments, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 5-7
(1963), and judicial comment, if not observance. See note 56 supra.
58. The former definition provided, in part, that a security included any beneficial
interest in title to property. 1949 Cal. Stats., c. 384 § 1, as amended, 1951 Cal. Stats. c.
825 § 1.
59. CAL. CoRnP. ConE ANN. § 25019 (West Supp. 1976).
60. 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188. Was this foray neces-
sary to the decision or merely dictum? See B. CARwozo, THm NATURE OF THE JUDIcIAL
PROCESS (1921):
[The judge. . . must . extract from the precedents the underlying principle, the
ratio decidendi ....
Id. at 28. See also Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALT LJ.
161 (1930).
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Thus, Silver Hills gave birth to what is commonly known as the "risk
capital" theory of a security.
In business situations such as that in Silver Hills, where there is
obvious oppression of a participant, it is probable that a judicial remedy
will be afforded. Thus, pure promotional schemes such as that recently
attempted by Glenn W. Turner ("Dare to be Great") 1 are likely to be
harpooned by the judiciary even when a statute must be stretched. In a
reasonable business situation outside the statute, however, even so for-
midable a proponent as the California Commissioner of Corporations
has had trouble proving the existence of a security under similar circum-
stances. 2 Although the California Commissioner of Corporations has
broad rulemaking authority, 63 he has not proposed or adopted a rule
concerning the status of club memberships. Perhaps because the Com-
missioner realizes he is in virgin territory he has chosen to regulate on a
case-by-case basis when his opinion has been requested,64 supplemented
61. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
62. Even though California has, from the inception of its securities regulations laws,
been the most "active and militant" of jurisdictions, Dalton, The California Corporate
Securities Act, 18 CAL.F. L. REv. 115, 136 (1930), a legitimate sale of investment grade
diamonds, with a buy-back agreement from the seller, was held to be outside the statu-
tory definition of a security. Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of Corps., 37 Cal. App.
3d 330, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1974).
63. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 25610 (West Supp. 1976).
64. While the Commissioner's opinion letters are persuasive, they are limited solely to
the facts presented by the inquirer. The preface to a Commissioner's Opinion letter
reads:
THIS INTERPRETIVE OPINION. . . is applicable only to the transaction iden-
tified in the request therefor, and may not be relied upon in connection with any
other transaction.
See, e.g., Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 75/33c (C.E.B. 1975). The trend which has
evolved can best be determined by reading the opinions themselves. Among the more
prominent are:
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 75/33c (C.E.B. 1975). No security where dues and
fees used to pay current operating expenses, but not to repay encumbrances. Id.
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 74/93c (C.E.B. 1974): Sale of memberships in
existing country club. Security not involved if fees are not necessary to repay any
loans or make any mortgage or lease payments on the facilities or proposed facilities. Id.
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps No. 74/82c (C.E.B. 1974): Nonprofit club, for members
only, partly to benefit Lutheran High School Association of Southern California. Secu-
rity involved, because a substantial part of the costs of initial construction will be paid
by fees and dues. No exemption available. Letter not an interpretive opinion. Id.
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 74/75c (C.E.B. 1974): No initiation fee, monthly
dues only. Developer purportedly obtained construction and permanent financing on
own credit, without regard to the project. Deposits escrowed. Security involved, because
net worth of developer irrelevant, escrow irrelevant, and dues will be used as necessary
to repay loans security involved. Id.
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 74/59c (C.E.B. 1974): Recreational Vehicle Park,
members and nonmembers. Memberships transferable and nonassessable, grant right to
camp and park recreational vehicles at preferred rates. Security not involved because
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
members' initiation fees and dues could be used to repay bank loans and mortgages.
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 74/52c (C.E.B. 1974): Clubs to be built on leased
grounds; no representation concerning source of construction funds. Lease payments
guaranteed by Veterans Administration. Members' deposits placed in trust account, sub-
ject to refund at request and release only on completion of facilities. Absent showing
that club will obtain, from sources other than members, capital required to pay taxes,
insurance premiums, expenses of maintenance, costs of operations, and lease payments,
Commissioner unable to render opinion that security not involved. Trust arrangement
insufficient, since funds exposed to claims of developer's creditors. Id.
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 74/44c (C.E.B. 1974): Security involved. Devel-
oper's capital contribution is all that counts. Availability of borrowed funds irrelevant.
Id.
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 73/134c (C.E.B. 1973): Security involved because
major capital requirements are to be satisfied by borrowing, and fees and dues are to
be used to repay loans. Id.
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 73/133c (C.E.B. 1973): Joint development of a
$400,000 club by developer with a $766,000 net worth, did not demonstrate that "pro-
posed issuer. . . has or will obtain from sources other than payments of members, the
capital required to secure and maintain the facilities promised." Therefore, a security
was involved. Id.
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. 73/94c (C.E.B. 1973): Members' fees and dues neces-
sary to finance travel events. Security involved because purchasers of memberships must
have at least a fair chance to realize their objectives. Id.
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 73/51c (C.E.B. 1973): Nonprofit club offers mem-
berships for $3,750 each. Development in conjunction with eleven million dollar village.
Held that securities were involved because what the members will receive is not equiva-
lent to the enjoyment of the club facilities promised to them. Id.
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 73/49c (C.E.B. 1973): Sale of memberships per-
mitting purchaser to use facilities on leased land for hunting and fishing. No showing
that at the time memberships were sold, funds were available to provide the facilities
and services offered. Therefore, a security is involved. Id.
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 73/45c (C.E.B. 1973): Unable to give opinion with-
out showing that at the time memberships were sold funds were available to provide
facilities and services offered without relying on the membership fees. Id.
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 73/11c (C.E.B. 1973): Members required to loan
funds to club. The loan is a security because it is an "evidence of indebtedness." Risk
capital theory also applies. Id.
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 72/99c (C.E.B. 1972): Security because unreason-
ably large portion of developer's financial requirements provided by borrowing. Id.
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 72/83c (C.E.B. 1972): Security involved because
of borrowing and the fact that club promoters will receive profits. Id.
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 72/61c (C.E.B. 1972): Developer has ten million
dollars in total assets, $218,000.00 in net worth, and development incident to real estate
program. Memberships not securities. Id.
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 72/76c (C.E.B. 1972): No security involved, because
membership fees are not being used to provide facilities and "payments will not sub-
stantially exceed benefits actually to be realized." Id. (emphasis added).
Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 71/131c (C.E.B. 1971): Charter memberships of-
fered. Thereafter, different classes of memberships offered. Facilities completed by de-
veloper with equity capital. Money collected from members prior to opening not used to
finance acquisition of property or cost of construction. Members required to pay two
months' dues in advance. No security involved. Two months' pre-payment of dues "can-
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by an opinion from his Office of Policy, published in July, 1975.65 The
July, 1975 newsletter states that the risk capital theory set out in Silver
Hills controls, and that the following items are pertinent criteria under
that theory:
(1) Only the funds actually contributed as equity capital by the
developers can be considered in determining whether the developers
have sufficient assets to providd the promised facilities. Neither the
total net worth of the developers nor the availability of construction
financing is relevant.
(2) If the monies received from the purchase of memberships are
necessary to repay loans or make mortgage or lease payments, the mon-
ies constitute "risk capital." In other words, a high debt-equity ratio is
indicative of "risk capital."
(3) Placing a purchaser's funds in trust or escrow is not determina-
tive of the existence of a security, since such funds are beyond the
purchaser's control and are exposed to mishandling and third party
claims against the developer.
(4) The fact that purchasers may unilaterally withdraw funds prior
to completion of the facilities is not determinative.
(5) The fact that initiation fees are to be paid in installments, or
may be characterized as monthly dues is not determinative. 66
These criteria are not binding. The practitioner must either file an
application in the dark or study existing files to assemble a set of criteria
by which to steer. The Commissioner's unofficial administrative opin-
ion appears to include within his regulatory ambit every club which
plans to rely, in part, on the use of borrowed funds. The fact that this
position is unofficial and has not yet received any judicial support is
probably due to the absence of a Silver Hills factual setting on which to
test the theory.
The Commissioner's position has also evolved from the conditions he
imposes for qualification of securities under Corporations Code section
25113.67 Together with the unofficial criteria discussed above, these
not be regarded as risk capital investment under [Silver Hills] inasmuch as payment
generally will not substantially exceed the benefits actually realized by members through
the use of club facilities provided." Id. (emphasis added).
65. Cal. Dept. of Corps., Corporate Securities Newsletter, July, 1975 at 4, col. 2.
66. Id. at 4, col. 3.
67. CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 25113 (West Supp. 1976). Securities can be qualified
under any of three methods depending upon the circumstances. These methods include
qualification by coordination, notification, or permit. Id. §§ 25111-13. Therefore, not
all clubs will seek qualification via the permit method.
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conditions provide one of the few indications of whether and when a
club membership will be deemed a security in California.
The developer may opt to take the safe route and seek to qualify the club memberships
as securities. This will necessitate adherence to strict conditions imposed by the
California Commissioner of Corporations. Review of the public files available at the
office of the California Commissioner of Corporations reveals that the following are the
more pertinent conditions currently being imposed by the Commissioner for any permit
issued to authorize the sale of club memberships. The Commissioner has not published
any rule; rather, he has evolved a set of conditions on a case-by-case basis. Unfortunat-
ely, some practices which were formerly permitted, such as graduated initiation fees, the
owner's unilateral right to increase dues, and the owner's unilateral right to impose
transfer fees, are now prohibited. The principal conditions currently being imposed, and
an evaluation of those conditions follow:
1. Graduated Initiation Fees Prohibited.
1.1 The Commissioner's present policy prohibits any differential in membership
fees, whether graduated or disguised in the form of a discount to early
buyers, or postponed for payment as part of monthly dues. This require-
ment is a potential killer, as witnessed by two recent examples:
1.1.1 In late 1975, a proposed club in-Palos Verdes apparently went under.
The organizers placed the blame solely on the Commissioner's re-
fusal to allow lower admission fees to the first members in.
1.1.2 A Los Angeles airport club originally filed an application to sell
individual and corporate memberships at $1,750.00 and up, and lim-
ited use family memberships at $250.00. The application was sub-
sequently withdrawn, and the club proceeded, without a permit, to sell
corporate and individual applications under the following fee struc-
ture:
Initiation Fee $350.00
Annual Enrollment Fee $150.00
Monthly Dues $ 30.00
2. Dues.
2.1 Dues must be reasonable. Again, the Commissioner has the discretion to
determine what is "reasonable."
2.2 Dues can be increased only by reference to a definable standard, such as
an increase in the cost of living scale in the area. The only other way
dues can ever be increased is by an affirmative vote of a majority, which,
as a practical matter, could be extremely difficult to obtain. The impact
of this regulation could possibly be softened by requiring an affirmative
vote of a quorum and establishing a quorum at fifty percent of all members.
3. Transferability.
3.1 All memberships must be freely transferable, without unreasonable restric-
tions. The only restriction which the Commissioner will presently permit
is approval of the proposed transferee's financial ability.
3.2 The owner is permitted to charge only a nominal transfer fee, which is
now set at ten percent.
3.3 No approval by a membership committee, by reference to other club affili-
ations or any similar generic standard is permitted as a prerequisite to a
transfer.
3.4 Transfers must be on a "first come, first served" basis.
3.5 Transfers require the Commissioner's consent. CAL. CoRP. COD ANN. §
25151 (West Supp. 1976).
4. Termination, Forfeiture, and Suspension.
4.1 The main grounds which will permit a termination of membership are
the nonpayment of initiation fees or dues. Even then, the Commissioner
presently requires that the delinquent party be given ninety days to cure
before membership is terminated.
4.2 On any termination, even for cause or failure to pay, no forfeiture is per-
mitted. Thus, the Commissioner apparently requires refund of the initiation
fee to any member who is unwillingly terminated. (This provision seems
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Under present law, with proper precautions, a California developer
unrealistic and grossly unfair. A substantial chance exists, therefore, that
the Commissioner's position here may be modified.)
4.3 During any period of suspension, whether for nonpayment or otherwise
the obligation to pay dues ceases.
5. Projections.
The owner must prepare and furnish to the Commissioner estimates of income
and expenses for the first five years of operation. The purported purpose of
this requirement is to convince the Commissioner that the club will have enough
members to sustain long-term operations. The purely conjectural basis of the
back end of these projections might be a sufficient ground to convince the Com-
missioner to modify this requirement.
6. Impound.
No funds received from prospective members may be released to the developer
until deposits in an impound account reach a minimum amount. The Commis-
sioner determines the amount by studying the developer's projections and decid-
ing how many members and how much money is necessary to ensure successful
club operations. (This condition is usually beneficial).
7. Membership Requirements.
The Commissioner prohibits what he terms "unreasonable" membership require-
ments. Thus, such things as requiring membership in other clubs, sponsorship
by present members or members of other clubs, minimum educational require-
ments, minimum social standing, sex, race or any other category is forbidden.
8. Sale of Assets.
The club assets can be sold only on either of the following conditions:
8.1 Approval of a majority of owners.
8.2 The members should be given the right of first refusal to purchase what
is referred to as "their own" club.
8.3 Sale to an outside buyer will be permitted only on a showing of the buyer's
ability to successfully operate the club and on an enforceable agreement
by the buyer to assume all liabilities and continue operation of the club
without increase in dues.
The Commissioner has permitted, however, a sale and leaseback transac-
tion where the developer was committed under the lease to continue club
operations.
9. Securities Sales Licenses Required.
The Commissioner takes the position that the developer's sales force are"agents" as defined by CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 25003 (West 1970). Simi-
larly, the employment of a manager or consultant to help in sales renders that
person or entity a "broker-dealer" under the law. Attaching either of these
labels is potentially disastrous since salesmen and broker-dealers are required
to take and pass securities law examinations which few persons connected with
clubs have the time or inclination to pass.
10. Management or Employment Contracts.
Management, employment or consulting contracts entered into by the club must
be short-term in duration and also provide that they are terminable by a ma-
jority vote of members.
11. Escrow Deposits.
Any prospective member who deposits funds in escrow pending construction
is entitled to a complete refund, without deduction or interest, at any time prior
to the completion of the facilities. (This is logical and necessary).
12. House Rules.
A Rules Committee, not weighted against members, must be established. As
part of the application process, the Commissioner has discretion to determine
what is unreasonable. Some rules which have been disallowed by the Commis-
sioner are:
12.1 A rule banning "swim suits, undershirts or numeraled jerseys."
12.2 Late fee charges in excess of .08 percent per month.
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can build a club and sell licenses without creating a security.6 There
are at least four situations in which a security is clearly not present.
They include:
(1) A facility which charges neither initiation fees nor monthly
dues. Revenues are provided solely from renthig court space on an
hourly basis.
(2) A club which accepts no deposits and makes no contracts
unless and until the facilities are ready. Even under the broadest
reading of Silver Hills, there must be some capital put at risk.00
(3) A club built out of equity capital, without resort to borrowed
funds. 70
(4) Sale of the right to use existing facilities.
71
12.3 A rule allowing ejection from the premises, and eventual ejection from the
Club for "conduct unbecoming a gentleman or lady."
13. Offering Circular.
An offering circular must be prepared, approved and distributed in connection
with all offers. All advertising must be filed with, and not disapproved by
the Commissioner, prior to use. Monthly newsletters are advertising.
14. Operations.
Recently, the Commissioner's Staff has become concerned with how a club will
operate once it is opened. Consequently, new conditions are now being imposed
such as a limitation on the total membership so that a favorable "member to
court" ratio is maintained. This recent condition is further evidence that regu-
lation is evolving on a case-by-case basis.
68. For the distinction between a "membership" and a "license," see notes 10-13 supra
and accompanying text.
69. See Op. Cal. Comm'r of Corps. No. 74/93c (C.E.B. 1974); Op. Cal. Comm'r of
Corps. No. 71/131c (C.E.B. 1971).
70. See the Commissioner's July, 1975 Newsletter in which the negative side of this
principle was recognized:
Only the funds actually contributed to a corporate issuer of memberships as equity
capital can be considered in determining whether the issuer has sufficient assets
to provide the promised facilities.
Cal. Dept. of Corps., Corporate Securities Newsletter, July, 1975, at 4, col. 3.
71. At least one court has found a club membership (not a license to use facilities) to
be outside the "investment contract" definition of a security where the promised benefits
are already available. In Jet Set Travel Club v. Corporations Comm'r, 535 P.2d 109
(Ore. Ct. App. 1975), the promoters had raised $70,000 from the sale of memberships
which was used to purchase an airplane. The memberships required payment of monthly
dues and granted the member a lifetime, non-transferable right to fly on Club trips for
as little as twenty dollars. The Oregon Corporations Commissioner sought to prevent
unregistered sales of the memberships in Oregon. In refusing to apply the risk capital
theory to the facts before it, the court stated:
[TIhe benefits of the membership have materialized and have been realized by
other members prior to any capital raised by the sale of Oregon memberships.
Id. at 112.
Clubs which are more interested in increased revenue through a larger roster rather
than preservation of their exclusive nature advertise their facilities at bargain rates. See
Los Angeles Times, Nov. 30, 1976, § 3 (Sports), at 2, where those interested in joining a
tennis club are urged to take advantage of the present $500 initiation fee which, the ad
states in less than subtle terms, will soon be doubled to $1,000.
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The Commissioner's interpretation and extension of Silver Hills, while
persuasive, does not have precedential value. The risk capital theory,
followed to its logical extreme, would prevent many commercial deal-
ings which rely on pre-selling as an integral part of their process.
72
Therefore, there are limits beyond which even the risk capital theory
cannot be stretched.
The final issue is whether a profit-oriented club can be developed
using construction financing without creating a security. If the develop-
er stays within the limits of the egregious greed demonstrated in Silver
Hills and accepts the fact that the Commissioner is a potential adversary,
the club can be built with borrowed funds without creating a security.
Such a development should follow this plan and sequence:
(1) Obtain title, or a long-term lease, to the real property. Don't
try to develop under even the most sophisticated system of options.
(2) Put as much equity capital into the project as possible.
7
1
(3) Take reservations without deposits. Alternatively, if deposits
or down payments are to be accepted, even before the first advertise-
ment, the developer should eliminate himself from any possible control
over or right to the deposits. This can best be accomplished by a formal
trust agreement with a commercial bank. A properly drawn trust
agreement will place deposits beyond the reach of the developer and any
potential claims of the developer's creditors. All costs of the trust
account are borne independently by the developer. The trust arrange-
ments themselves are simple and provide two basic contingencies:
(a) Until the facilities are ready, the applicant may unilaterally
withdraw his deposit at any time merely by making a request;
(b) The funds on deposit may be turned over directly to the de-
veloper only after a physical inspection by the trust representative to
determine that the promised facilities are ready for use.
(4) All advertising must be carefully reviewed to insure full disclo-
sure of all material facts. Anti-fraud protection is essential, even when
a security is not present.74
(5) The first document which those persons wishing to join the
club should sign is an application. The application should be designed
72. For example, these include attempts by a shopping center developer to line up
tenants prior to obtaining construction and permanent financing pre-construction sales
campaigns by developers of residential property or efforts by maufacturers to obtain
firm purchase orders (backlog) to help secure the capital or financing necessary to
manufacture the product for delivery against the purchase order.
73. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
74. See note 1 supra.
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to provide maximum disclosure as well as facts from which the develop-
er can limit the transaction to intrastate purchasers only. (This is not a
concession that a security, under the federal definition of the term, is
present, it is merely an added precaution.) If deposits or down pay-
ments are to be received, the second document the applicant should sign
is the trust agreement with the bank.
(6) A license contract which clearly spells out the developer's
ultimate control of all financial and operating aspects should be pre-
pared. This agreement is the heart of the relationship. In it the
licensee's rights (which are, essentially, the right to pay for the use of
the facilities) are defined. Again, this agreement is an appropriate
place for disclosure and inclusion of. any restrictions on transfer or sale
of the license which the developer may decide are economically wise and
legally prudent.75 The license agreement need not be a sales deterrent.
All of the essential elements can be covered in a document which extends
only to both sides of one page.
(7) Club operating rules should be drafted and given to each
licensee before, or at least concurrently with, execution of the license
agreement. The operating rules (sometimes referred to as bylaws)
establish those areas in which the developer has the financial and
operational control necessary to preserve the integrity of the develop-
ment. The operating rules should not be the subject of any debate.
(8) House rules, which establish committees of licensees and grant
authority to establish dress codes, game rules and make other decisions
not essential to the financial or operating integrity of the club, should be
prepared and distributed with the operating rules. House rules can
safely be subject to alteration by a vote of licensees.
(9) As a final protective step, release of trust account funds should
be permitted only after a physical inspection by the trustee to determine
whether the promised facilities are ready for use. The developer should
deposit any funds received from the trust account directly into the club
operating account. None of these funds should be used to pay any
secured debt. Projections should permit debt service out of post-
opening dues and other sources of operating revenues.
75. In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the coop-
erative's enabling documents prohibited resale of an apartment at more than its initial
cost. Appreciation in value and the opportunity to sell a unit at a profit, therefore,
are elements which each developer must consider. See also 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Lako-
leson, 365 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 453 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974).
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The steps set out above are intended to insure the development of a
club without inadvertently creating a security. In California, however,
a developer is faced with an initial command decision: Should he
concede the issue and apply for a permit, accepting the Commissioner's
conditions, or should he plan his finances so that the project can be built
without creating a security? The first course, while certainly the safest,
consumes more time and expense. More critically, however, under
current administrative policies, it denies to the developer the right to use
incremental increases in initiation fees as a sales tool. In a competitive
market, one of the most compelling sales points is the possibility of a
price increase. Without this real and psychological incentive, the sales
program may be severely hindered. On the other hand, the inability to
use or rely on deposits should not inhibit a real estate developer. The
main reason in obtaining deposits and applications should be to sample
the market, not to provide initial capital.
V. A SUGGESTION FOR APPROPRIATE REGULATION
Not all developments will be properly planned and there is no way to
predict where Silver Hills might strike again. New clubs are being
planned, constructed and opened. The market has not reached satura-
tion. It is possible that a current developer of a failing club could be
dipping into "escrow" deposits in an effort to complete construction. As
is usual on the frontiers of the developing area of law, one bad apple
spoils the whole legal barrel by providing those perfect facts for a test
case. Thus, given bad facts, such as misuse or misappropriation of de-
positors' money, the California Commissioner of Corporations might
obtain judicial support for his current, unofficial administrative position.
Assuming, therefore, that regulation is inevitable and that it will be
prophylactic, encompassing legitimate, non-risk developments as well as
risk capital ventures, the question becomes who should regulate and
under what theory?
In theory and in practice, in California, the Real Estate Commissioner
and his staff should be given the task and opportunity to develop
appropriate standards. Ideally this jurisdiction should be conferred
after the fact-finding process which leads to the adoption of a series of
statutes. A new Chapter 5 could be added to Division 4, Part 2
of the California Business and Professions Code.' 6 Part 2 is now aptly
titled "Regulations of Transactions."77 The process which has evolved
76. CAL. Bus. & PRoP. CODE ANN. §§ 11000-709 (West 1964).
77. Id.
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under the statute provides the logical precedent and administrative
machinery for regulation of club development. For example, under
Business and Professions Code section 11013.2 a developer must pro-
vide a completion bond, or impound funds until completion of the
project.7 8 Under the California Administrative Code,79 the Real Estate
Commissioner has adopted a series of comprehensive regulations
which, with slight modification, could evenly and properly control club
development. For example, a public report" coupled with the control
of advertisings' and the licensing of salesmen 2 forms an appropriate
regulatory pattern.
The adoption of appropriate legislation, however, without any organ-
ized effort, is probably wishful thinking. Expansion by the Real Estate
Commissioner of existing regulatory patterns, therefore, would be a
more appropriate response to the problem than would a further, unwar-
ranted expansion of Silver Hills. A case could be made that a club
license or membership fits within the definition of an interest subject to
the regulations of the Real Estate Commissioner.8 Once within the
statutory ambit, the regulatory pattern of the California Administrative
Code s4 could then be applied.
If the bargain between the developer or operator of a private club
organized for profit is to be regulated, that regulation should come from
the appropriate source. The California Commissioner of Corporations
deals with stocks, commodities and other investments. The Real Estate
Commissioner, on the other hand, deals with and has developed a
regulatory pattern more suited to clubs which are, in essence, real estate
projects designated for use and not investment. If the problem is seri-
ous enough to require state supervision, it should be under the agency
which has developed expertise in protecting users of land rather than
investors of money.
V1. CONCLUSION
The economic bargain in the club membership situation is different
from arrangements designed to provide passive investors a profit.
Presently, the normal bargain is payment in return for a place to play.
78. Id. § 11013.2.
79. 10 Cal. Adm. Code §§ 2790-2819.
80. Id. §§ 2795-95.3.
81. Id. § 2799.1.
82. Id. §§ 2750-55.
83. CAL. Bus. & PROp. CODE ANN. § 1104.5(e) (1) (West Supp. 1976).
84. 10 Cal. Adm. Code §§ 2700-3004.
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Whether the place to play is supplied by the payment of an initiation fee
and monthly dues, or merely by hourly payments, is irrelevant. Once
the club facilities are ready for use, neither the method by which they
were financed nor the source of revenue is material in analyzing
whether or not licensees need protection.
At the federal level, the expansion of the investment contract facet of
the definition of a security should make club developers wary. Though
it would appear that the club will rarely meet the Forman criteria for the
definition of a security,85 the SEC has recently refused to issue no
action letters in the club membership area.80 As a result, the developer
who ignores the possibility that his membership plan creates a security
is risking the success of his venture. The prudent developer will take
advantage of the "safe harbor" offered by Rule 14787 to obtain an intra-
state offering exemption88 or, alternatively, to seek registration.
At the state level, no one can safely predict the extent of the risk
capital theory. The California Commissioner of Corporations has issued
criteria in an attempt to clarify that theory. 9 However, these criteria do
not carry the force of law. Hence, the developer's attempt to define the
extent of the risk capital theory or to rely on the Commissioner's criteria
leaves him on precarious ground. It would seem that governmental
regulation is necessary. If such regulation should issue, the line defin-
ing the outer boundaries of what constitutes a security should be drawn
not at Silver Hills' extreme outer limits, but rather somewhere on this
side of a prudently financed development.
The present furious pace of club development could logically lead to
an over-saturated market, thereby producing a failure. If a failing club
produces the loss of capital put at risk, Silver Hills may apply, but only
after a protracted trial and appeals period. If the state has an interest in
club development, it should ideally be defined through the fact finding
process which leads to the adoption of a statute, and not by unofficial
administrative regulation or by an after-the-fact judicial response to a
failure.
85. See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
86. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
87. SEC Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1976).
88. See notes 42-51 supra and accompanying text.
89. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
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